A number of candidates are competing for a prize. Each candidate is privately informed about his type. The decision-maker who allocates the prize wants to give it to the candidate with the highest type. Each candidate can take a test that reveals his type at a cost. I show that if competition increases, candidates reveal more information when the cost is high, and less information when it is low. Nevertheless, the decision-maker always benets from greater competition. If competition is large, mandatory disclosure is Pareto-dominated by voluntary disclosure. When the test is noisier, candidates are more likely to take it.
Since the test is costly, not all candidates take it. Instead, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which a candidate takes the test if and only if his type is above some threshold. In that case, he wins the prize if the test shows him to have a higher type than any other candidate who takes the test. On the other hand, if a candidate does not take the test, the decision-maker learns that his type is below the threshold. Then the candidate can only get the prize if nobody else takes the test, in which case the decision-maker allocates the prize at random.
The rst result of the paper shows that competition aects information revelation in a non-monotone way. When the cost of the test is high, increasing the number of candidates makes them weakly more likely to take the test. But when the cost is low, an increase in the number of candidates results in less information revelation. Thus, greater competition can make the decision-maker less informed. At the same time, even when the number of candidates goes to innity, the probability that some information is revealed remains distinct from zero and from one.
To see the intuition, consider a candidate i whose type is at the threshold. Increasing competition reduces i's chance to receive the prize after taking the test, since it becomes increasingly likely that some competitor has a higher type, takes the test, and wins over i. It also reduces i's chance of getting the prize without taking the test, because the decision-maker will randomise over a larger number of candidates. But if the cost of the test is low, the threshold is low as well. Then increasing the number of candidates has a large eect on the probability that some other candidate has a type above the threshold. Hence, the rst eect dominates the second, and i becomes less willing to take the test.
Second, I show that even though competition can result in less information revelation, the decision-maker always benets from an increase in competition. On the other hand, an increase in the cost of the test hurts the decision-maker but can make candidates better o by reducing inecient testing.
Third, the paper examines the eect of the decision-maker committing not to give the prize to any candidate who does not take the test. There is a substantial literature focusing on mandatory disclosure as a way of making decision-makers better o 1 . But does the decision-maker benet from making disclosure mandatory when disclosure is costly and informed parties compete? On the one hand, such a move reduces the payo of a candidate who does not take the test to zero. Hence, candidates become more willing to take it, and the decision-maker receives more information. On the other hand, if no candidate takes the test, such a commitment leaves the decision-maker unable to allocate the prize, reducing her utility. But if the number of candidates is very large, then, even without commitment, a candidate who does not take the test is very unlikely to win the prize.
Thus, the rst eect disappears, while the second eect remains. Hence, when competition is high, making the test mandatory strictly reduces the decision-maker's utility. Since mandatory disclosure makes candidates worse o as well, this implies that under strong competition, mandatory disclosure is strictly Pareto-dominated by voluntary disclosure. For example, when candidates' types are uniformly distributed, making the test voluntary is better whenever the number of candidates is larger than two.
Fourth, I consider what happens when the test sends a noisy signal about a candidate's type. The paper shows that candidates are more likely to take the test when it is noisy than when it is not. More generally, making the test noisier increases the probability that candidates take it. Intuitively, without noise, if a candidate whose type is at the threshold takes the test, he can only win if no other candidate has a higher type. With noise, he can also 1 See an overview in Dranove and Jin (2010). 3 win if some candidate has a higher type but does worse on the test. Hence, the incentive to take the test increases.
To see the implications of these results, consider a market in which several rms compete by oering products of uncertain quality. Each rm can choose to credibly reveal the quality of its product by asking an independent body to certify it at some cost. If more rms enter the market, do buyers become more informed? The paper suggests that an increase in competition will reduce information revelation when certication is cheap relative to prot margins in the market, but not when it is costly.
Alternatively, consider an election contested by several candidates. Each candidate take a costly action to communicate her competence for example, to take part in a public discussion that will be covered by media. The media, however, transmits information to voters with some noise. That noise is larger when the quality of journalism is lower, when voters have less trust in media, or when media penetration is low (so voters tend to learn the content of media reports through their friends, rather than directly). The paper suggests that in such situations, candidates will be more likely to invest in campaigning.
Furthermore, consider university applicants that can reveal their ability through a standardised test such as SAT or GRE. Should universities make submission of test scores optional rather than mandatory? While negative eects of highly competitive university admission tests on applicants have been noted before 2 , this paper suggests that not only candidates, but also universities can be better o if submission of test scores is made optional.
Finally, consider the problem of a rm running a standardised test. The rm wants to maximise its prot, and can choose the noise level of the test.
The results imply that increasing noise increases the expected number of test takers, and hence the rm's expected revenue. While it is possible that a more precise test is more costly to run, the paper suggests that the rm can intentionally make the test imprecise even in the absence of this factor 3 .
The rest of this section discusses the related literature. Section 2 describes the baseline model. Section 3 examines the eect of competition on disclosure. Section 4 discusses how players' utilities are aected by competition and cost of the test. Section 5 analyses the eect of making the test 2 See a discussion in Olszewski and Siegel (2016 7 Some authors examine contests in which there is exogenous heterogeneity among participants (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Liu et al., 2018) . In these papers, contestants' types represent the cost of exerting eort that increases a candidate's chance of winning.
In contrast, in my setup, the test has the same cost for all candidates, and a candidate's type directly determines the chance of winning the prize if the candidate takes the test.
In some other all-pay auction models, e.g. Siegel (2009 Siegel ( , 2014 , contestants can have asymmetric head starts. These are quite dierent from types in this model, however: rst, they are commonly known, and second, a head start aects a contestant's' chance of winning the prize regardless of their eort level. shows, the decision-maker strictly prefers not to make the test mandatory for receiving the prize, even though such a rule maximises the expected number of candidates who take the test (and hence would be optimal in an analogous all-pay auction model).
Another literature has looked at information disclosure by senders who cannot lie, but can choose how much information to reveal. When disclosure is costless and there is no competition, full revelation is the typical benchmark result (see Dranove and Jin, 2010, for an overview) 10 . On the other hand, when disclosure has a cost, Jovanovic (1982) shows (in a setting without competition) that full revelation is not an equilibrium. Subsequent research on costly disclosure in competitive settings has looked at the interplay between rms' decision to reveal product quality and their price-setting behaviour.
In particular, Cheong and Kim (2004) and Guo and Zhao (2009) their types with some probability, and those who are informed can disclose their types at no cost and without noise. In this setting, they show that competition has a monotone negative eect on disclosure, unlike this paper, which shows that the eect can be positive or negative for dierent costs and levels of competition. The result that making the test less informative increases the expected number of candidates who take it echoes some of the results in Alonso (2017).
In that paper, workers sort between two rms. Each worker has a pair of types, which measures his productivity in each rm. The value of having a job is endogenously determined through bargaining. To select workers, a rm administers an interview that provides an imperfect signal about a worker's type. Participating in an interview is necessary to get the job. A key dierence is that in Alonso (2017), workers are imperfectly informed about their types, but have perfect information about the realised distribution of types (since there is a continuum of workers and a continuum of vacancies).
In my paper, on the other hand, each candidate i is fully informed about his type, but the realised distribution of types (and, in particular, the number of candidates who have a higher type than i does) is random (because the number of candidates is nite). With this dierent setup, Alonso (2017) shows that a more informative interview can, depending on the workers' information structure, encourage or discourage applications. In my paper, on the other hand, making the test more informative has a monotone negative eect on the probability that a candidate applies.
Less closely related are models of Bayesian persuasion by competing senders 12 . In these papers disclosure is costless, senders commit to a disclosure strategy before learning the state, and senders can design an information disclosure scheme rather than having to use an exogenous test with xed parameters such as noise.
Model
There are n > 1 candidates (male) that are competing for a prize allocated by a decision-maker (female). The value of the prize to each candidate is 1. Each candidate i has a type x i ∈ [0, 1], which is his private information. Types are drawn independently from a distribution F with an associated density f . Each candidate can decide to take a test at a cost c ∈ (0, 1). The test, if taken, perfectly reveals his type to the decision-maker 13 .
The decision-maker receives a payo x i if she allocates the prize to candidate i thus, the decision-maker would like to allocate the prize to a candidate with the highest type. If the decision-maker's posterior belief is such that several candidates have the highest expected type, she randomises between them uniformly.
The timing is as follows. First, nature draws x i for every candidate i. Each candidate learns his type. Candidates then simultaneously decide whether to take the test. The decision-maker learns the types of candidates who took it. She then chooses a candidate that receives the prize. The paper focuses on symmetric equilibria.
Eect of Competition

Equilibrium
At a symmetric equilibrium, the strategy of every candidate i is a function h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] which maps the candidate's type to the probability of taking the test.
The decision-maker will allocate the prize to a candidate whose ex post expected type is the highest. At the equilibrium, then, if a candidate's type is close to zero, it is very likely that somebody has a higher type. Thus, a candidate with a very low type who takes the test is very unlikely to win. He then prefers not to take it and avoid paying the cost c. If the type is higher, the probability of winning is (weakly) larger. Then there should exist some cuto such that a candidate takes the test if and only if his type is above it.
This intuition implies the following lemma: Lemma 1. At every symmetric equilibrium, there exists a threshold
In words, any symmetric equilibrium is characterised by a threshold b such that candidates whose types are above b always take the test, while candidates whose types are below b never take the test except for, possibly, 13 Section 6 considers the case when the test is noisy, and the case when the cost is a function of a candidate's type. 9 some set of types whose mass is zero 14 . This last possibility is irrelevant, because the paper examines what happens in expectation. I will thus focus on the pure-strategy equilibrium in which each candidate takes the test if and only if his type is above some b ≥ 0.
The decision-maker's expected payo equals the expected type of the candidate whom she gives the prize. At a Bayesian equilibrium, if candidate i has a type above b (and thus takes the test), the decision-maker learns his type. Hence, if at least one candidate takes the test, the decision-maker is able to allocate the prize to the best candidate with certainty. In these situations, I will say that the decision-maker makes an informed decision.
If candidate i does not take the test, the decision-maker's expectation of i's type equals E F (x | x < b), where E F (·) denotes expectation taken over F . This expression is well-dened whenever b > 0. Note that since c > 0, b = 0 cannot be an equilibrium if it were, there would be some ε > 0 such that a candidate with type below ε would have such a low probability of winning the prize that he would prefer to deviate and not take the test.
Since b > E F (x | x < b), a candidate who does not take the test has a lower ex-post expected type than any candidate who does. He can thus only win the prize if nobody else takes the test, which happens with probability F (b) n−1 . In that case, the decision-maker gives him the prize with probability 1 n . Thus, if a candidate does not take the test, his overall probability of winning the prize is F (b)
n−1 1 n . On the other hand, a candidate with type x i > b takes the test and wins the prize with certainty if every other candidate has a lower type which happens with probability F (x i ) n−1 .
Suppose that c ≤ n−1 n
. At x i = b, candidate i must be indierent between taking and not taking the test, which yields the equation
On the other hand, if c > n−1 n , then the left-hand side of (1) is smaller than the right-hand side for all b > 0. Hence, the equilibrium strategy of every candidate is to never reveal the type, so b = 1. Hence, the equilibrium threshold b is characterised as follows:
Lemma 2. The unique symmetric equilibrium is given by
Uniqueness follows from the fact that the expression in the lemma is in closed form.
Competition and Disclosure
There are two natural ways of measuring the degree to which information is disclosed. One such indicator is F (b), the probability that a candidate does not reveal his type. Another indicator is F (b)
n . This is the probability that there is no disclosure i.e. that even the candidate with the highest type does not take the test. Thus, 1 − F (b)
n is the probability that the decisionmaker makes an informed decision that is, knows with certainty that the candidate who receives the prize has the highest type. n .
This characterises the eect of increasing competition on F (b) for different pairs of (c, n). Figure 1 illustrates this result. As the gure shows, increasing the number of candidates does not change the probability that a candidate takes the test when n is low (relative to a boundary that depends on c), increases that probability when n is moderate, and reduces that probability when n is high. In particular, if c <
, an increase in n always reduces the probability that a candidate takes the test. , increasing n increases the probability of an informed decision only until n reaches 1 1−ce . After that, increasing n 15 Alternatively, the result can be expressed in terms of the values of c. An increase in n reduces the probability that the best candidate reveals his type if c ∈ 0, To summarise, increasing competition raises the amount of information available to the decision-maker when the cost of the test is high, and lowers it when the cost of the test is low.
To see the intuition behind this result, consider the marginal candidate, whose type equals b. For him, increasing n has two eects. First, the expected payo from taking the test falls, because F (b)
n−1 , the probability that no other candidate has a higher type, decreases. Second, the expected payo from not taking the test falls as well, because 1 n , the probability of being randomly selected to receive the prize when nobody takes the test, becomes smaller. But if c is low, then b is low as well. In that case, the impact of increasing the number of candidates on F (b)
n−1 is relatively large. Thus, the rst eect dominates the second, and the marginal candidate becomes less willing to take the test. On the other hand, if c is high (but not so high that nobody takes the test), then F (b) is close to 1. Then increasing n does not change F (b)
n−1 much, and so the second eect dominates the rst. Finally, if c is very large, then no candidate takes the test, and a further increase in n has no impact on information disclosure.
The Case of Large Competition
We can also check what happens in the limit when n goes to innity. Since 1. Hence, the probability that a given candidate takes the test goes to zero. Intuitively, when n → +∞, a cuto b < 1 cannot be an equilibrium if it were, then for any type x ∈ (b, 1), there would almost surely be a candidate with a type above x. Hence, a candidate with type x would almost surely not win the prize, and hence would strictly prefer not taking the test.
Nevertheless, the probability that the decision-maker makes an informed decision does not go to zero, as the following result shows: Proposition 3. When n approaches innity, the probability that no candidate takes the test approaches c. 
Proof. lim
Hence, when n → +∞, the probability that at least the best candidate takes the test approaches 1 − c. Thus, even when competition is very strong, the probability that the decision-maker makes an informed decision remains distinct from zero (and also from one).
Intuitively, suppose that F (b)
n approached 1 as n became large. Then in the limit the expected type of a candidate who does not take the test would equal E F (x). But then any candidate with a type above E F (x) would win the prize with probability 1 if he took the test. Hence, he would deviate, contradicting the initial assumption.
Utilities and Welfare
Eect of Competition
Does the decision-maker gain from an increase in competition? Increasing n has two eects on her payo. On the one hand, since the type of each candidate is an independent draw from the distribution F , increasing the number of draws increases the expected type of the best candidate. In a perfect information setting, this would make the decision-maker better o. However, when c is small, greater competition can also increase the probability that even the best candidate does not take the test. If that happens, the decision-maker will have to allocate the prize at random, which means that the prize will not necessarily go to the best candidate. The reduction of information available to the decision-maker creates a negative eect of competition on her payo.
Nevertheless, the following will show that the rst eect will always dominate the second, and greater competition is always better for the decision-maker.
To check this, we need to determine her expected payo. With probability 1−F (b) n , at least one candidate has a type above b, and takes the test. Then the decision-maker allocates the prize to the candidate with the highest type.
In that case, the decision-maker's expected payo equals
where the above expression uses the fact that the cdf of max {x} is F (x) n .
On the other hand, with probability F (b)
n , no candidate takes the test.
14 Then the decision-maker allocates the prize to a random candidate, and her expected payo equals
Overall, the decision-maker's expected utility equals
When n ≤ , an increase in n strictly increases v.
Hence, an increase in competition makes the decision-maker strictly better o, unless no candidates take the test (in which case the decision-maker's payo is not aected by n). This contrasts with the standard result in the literature on auctions with endogenous entry, in which the seller typically benets from restricting the number of potential bidders (see e.g. Levin and Smith, 1994) .
Intuitively, while greater competition can reduce the probability that the decision-maker makes an informed decision, this can only occur when the cost of the test is low, as Proposition 2 states. But if c is low, then so is F (b). Hence, each new candidate is likely to take the test, so the positive eect of an increase in the number of draws from F is large, outweighing the negative eect. On the other hand, in an equivalent auction with endogenous entry, a bidder who does not enter would be unable to win the good thus, the payo from not entering would be zero. Because of this, an increase in the number of potential bidders would always reduce entry, regardless of the cost 16 , and hence greater competition can hurt the seller.
Eect of Cost
The cost c of the test can aect the decision-maker's utility by aecting b, and hence the amount of information that is revealed. If c > n−1 n , then b = 1, and a further increase in c does not change it. If c < n−1 n , then an increase in c increases b, making candidates less likely to reveal their types, and hence reducing the decision-maker's expected payo.
What about candidates? Since candidates are symmetric, a randomly selected candidate wins the prize with an ex ante probability of 1 n . With probability 1 − F (b) he also takes the test and pays the cost c. Thus, his overall expected utility equals
This yields the following result: Intuitively, for candidates the test is a deadweight loss it only serves to reallocate the prize between candidates at a cost to those who take the test.
If c < n−1 n , an increase in c has two opposite eects. On the one hand, by raising the threshold b, it reduces the expected number of candidates who take the test, thus increasing candidates' utility. On the other hand, those candidates who do take the test have to pay a higher cost. If c is suciently small, then the eect of increasing c on b is small as well, so the second eect dominates the rst. The opposite is true when c is moderately large. Finally, if c > n−1 n , then no candidate takes the test, and increasing its cost has no eect.
Since the decision-maker always prefers a lower cost unless c > 
Mandatory Disclosure
Can the decision-maker change the rules of the game to increase her welfare?
This paper does not focus on nding a generic optimal mechanism for the 16 decision-maker 17 . Instead, it will look at one particular avenue that the decision-maker can pursue: committing to never give the prize to a candidate who does not take the test. For example, universities often require every applicant to take the test for his or her application to be considered. Is such a commitment optimal?
By an argument similar to the one in Lemma 1, when testing is mandatory for receiving the prize, the equilibrium has a similar threshold form to the one described earlier:
Lemma 3. Under mandatory disclosure, at every symmetric equilibrium, there exists a thresholdb ∈ [0, 1] such that h (x) = 1 for all x >b, and
Proof. Identical to the proof of Lemma 1 with m and π (m) replaced by zero.
At the threshold, a candidate receives a payo of F b
takes the test. A candidate who does not take it receives a payo of zero.
Indierence condition gives us
It is easy to see that F b and F b n = c n n−1 are strictly increasing in n for any c ∈ (0, 1). Thus, in contrast to the case without commitment, under mandatory disclosure an increase in competition has a monotone eect on the amount of information that is disclosed.
At the same time, we can see that F b < F (b). Hence, a given candidate is more likely to take the test when disclosure is mandatory than when it is compulsory. Intuitively, this happens because under mandatory testing, the expected payo of a candidate who does not take the test becomes zero, while under voluntary disclosure he is still able to win the prize.
Under voluntary testing, the expected payo of a randomly selected candidate is given by (3). Under mandatory testing, it equals 1 n − c 1 − F b . 
Let D (n) ≡v − v be the decision-maker's expected gain from making the test mandatory. When n is suciently large, we can show that D (n) is negative, and hence the decision-maker is better o when the test is voluntary.
Since voluntary testing is also better for candidates, we have the following result:
Proposition 6. For all c > 0, and any F , there existsn such that voluntary testing strictly Pareto-dominates mandatory testing for all n >n.
Intuitively, a commitment to only select the winner from candidates who took the test has two eects. On the one hand, since candidates become more likely to take the test, mandatory testing increases the probability that the best candidate reveals his type. Hence, the decision-maker is more likely to make an informed decision, which increases her expected payo. On the other hand, if nobody takes the test, this commitment leaves the decisionmaker unable to allocate the prize. Since by assumption, the decision-maker always prefers to give the prize to some candidate, this reduces her payo.
However, as n becomes large, a candidate who does not take take the test becomes increasingly less likely to win the prize even without commitment.
Thus, his payo F (b) n−1 1 n = cn n−1 1 n converges to zero. Then in the limit, a candidate's incentive to take the test under voluntary disclosure becomes the same as under mandatory disclosure. Hence, the rst eect of commitment disappears. On the other hand, the second, negative eect of commitment remains: as n → ∞, the probability that no candidate takes the test stays strictly positive, as Proposition 3 has established. Thus, the overall gain from the commitment is negative when n is suciently large.
Whether mandatory testing is better than voluntary testing for small values of n depends on the shape of F . In the simple case in which types are distributed uniformly, n does not need to be very large for a voluntary test to be optimal, as the next result shows:
is uniform, then voluntary testing strictly Paretodominates mandatory testing if and only if n > 2.
Recall that by assumption, n ≥ 2. Hence, when the distribution of types is uniform, keeping the test voluntary is better whenever the number of candidates is larger than the minimum that is necessary for the competitive testing model to be meaningful.
Extensions
Noisy Test
So far we have assumed that the test perfectly reveals the candidate's type.
Suppose, however, that the test is imperfect. For example, a candidate on the academic job market may invest eort into writing an additional research paper, but the paper may be a noisy signal of his quality. Similarly, an election candidate may invest in campaigning to inform voters about his competence, but the media may present her message imperfectly.
Suppose that rather than revealing the candidate i's type x i , the test reveals a test score s i = x i + z i , where z i is noise. When a candidate decides to take the test, he knows his type x i , but not the realisation of the noise. After candidate i takes the test, nature draws z i from some distribution G with smooth logconcave density g that has full support on R. Dierent candidates' noise realisations are drawn independently.
We can show that the decision-maker prefers a candidate with a higher test score. Specically, the following lemma proves that when noise is additive, logconcave g is equivalent to the monotone likelihood ratio condition, which, as Milgrom (1981) shows, implies that a higher score is a more favourable signal about the candidate's type: Lemma 4. If candidates i and j take the test, and s i > s j , then the decisionmaker has a higher expected utility from giving the prize to candidate i then to candidate j.
Then we can show that, as in the baseline model, the equilibrium symmetric strategy is of a threshold form:
Lemma 5. At every symmetric equilibrium, for any G, there exists a threshold b ∈ [0, 1] such that h (x) = 1 for all x > b, and h (x) = 0 for all x < b.
If b = 1, nobody takes the test, and a small increase in noise has no eect. Consider instead the case when b < 1. If a candidate does not take the test, the decision-maker knows that his type is below b; while if he takes the test, the decision-maker knows that his type is above b. Thus, a candidate who does not take the test can never win over a candidate who takes it. If two or more candidates take the test, Lemma 4 ensures that the decision-maker will give the prize to the candidate with the highest test score. Now suppose candidate i takes the test. If the test produces noise z, the decision-maker learns i's score b + z. Then i wins the prize if each of his competitors either (i) does not take the test, or (ii) takes the test and receives a score below b + z. For a given competitor, the probability of the former event is Pr (x < b). The latter event happens if the competitor has a type x > b and, after taking the test, receives a score x +ẑ < b + z. The probability of this is Pr (x > b ∧ẑ < b + z − x). Since there are n − 1 competitors, the probability that i wins the prize equals
Then ex ante, before i's test noise z is realised, his probability of winning the prize after taking the test equals
Thus, when b < 1, the equilibrium is determined by the indierence
By varying the G, we can vary how noisy the test is. In particular, consider a family of distributions of the form G λ (z) ≡ G (λz) for dierent values of λ ∈ (0, +∞). Increasing (decreasing) λ makes the noise more (less) concentrated around zero, and hence makes the test less (more) noisy 18 . How does a change in λ aect the equilibrium?
It turns out that a candidate is more likely to take the test when the test is noisier. This is summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 7. For any F and G, and any values of n and c, decreasing λ decreases b.
To see the intuition behind this result, take the case when there is no noise, and consider candidate i whose type equals b. If i takes the test, he wins the prize if and only if all other candidates have types below b, and don't take the test. Now make the test noisy, and suppose that b were held constant. If the i takes the test, he still wins over anyone who does not take it, since not taking the test reveals that one's type is below b. But now i can also win over a competitor who has a higher type, if that competitor takes the test and receives a lower score than i. Hence, i's chance of winning the prize after taking the test increases. Thus, i becomes more willing to take the test, and the threshold b decreases.
Thus, candidates are more likely to take the test when the test is less informative. This may seem surprising: one could think that as λ → 0 (i.e. as the test becomes innitely noisy), the test ceases to carry any information, and candidates should be unwilling to take it. Note, however, that as λ → 0, the test is only uninformative in the limit for any positive λ, a higher test score still indicates that the candidate has a higher type. Hence, the test remains informative, and candidates with high types still prefer to take it.
Since each candidate is more likely to take the test when it is noisier, greater noise increases aggregate expenditure on the test, as the following result states:
18 For example, if G is a normal distribution, then λ is proportional to the inverse of its variance.
Corollary 2. Expected total spending on the test increases if λ decreases. Proof. A candidate takes the test with probability 1 − F (b). Hence, the expected spending on the test is cn [1 − F (b)], which increases as λ falls.
Thus, if the test is run by a monopolist (as is, for example, the GRE), the monopolist has an incentive to make the test less precise.
Heterogeneous Costs
The basic model assumed that the cost of taking the test is the same for all candidates. This section will show that the basic results of the paper also hold when the cost is allowed to depend on candidate's type. For a specic application, suppose that a number of students are competing for a scholarship. The decision-maker would like to give the scholarship to the best applicant. Each applicant can take a test, and the eort required to take it is higher when the applicant's ability is lower.
Formally, suppose that for a candidate with type x, the cost of taking the test is c (x) ∈ [c, c], where 0 < c < c < 1. Let c (x) be continuously dierentiable and strictly decreasing in type. Thus, a more qualied applicant will nd it easier to take the test. If b < 1, the equilibrium is given by the indierence condition
This is an equilibrium whenever c (1) = c ≤ n−1 n
n−1 1 n for all b, and hence the equilibrium is given by b = 1. Note that the left-hand side of (5) is increasing in b, and the right-hand side is decreasing in b hence, the equilibrium is unique.
The eect of increasing the number of candidates on information revelation is then captured by the following result: To interpret this result, consider the case when c is low, and hence the test is cheap (relative to the value of the prize) even for candidates with low type.
In particular, suppose that c < ≤ 0, and thus an increase in competition increases the probability that a given candidate takes the test.
Hence, the basic logic of the results from Section 3 that competition increases (reduces) information disclosure when the cost of the test is relatively high (low) holds when the cost of the test is heterogeneous.
What if the decision-maker commits not to give the prize to anyone who does not take the test? As before, the expected payo of a candidate who does not take it equals zero, and the equilibrium thresholdb is given by
We can verify that, as before, b >b. To see that, dene z (x) ≡ Given this, we can show that the decision-maker's expected gain from making the test mandatory is negative when competition is suciently strong.
Proposition 9. For all c (·), and any F , lim n→∞ D (n) < 0.
Hence, the result from Section 5 holds in a more general setting in which the cost of the test depends on the candidate's type.
Conclusions
This paper developed a model of costly information disclosure by candidates competing for a prize. Disclosure was modelled as a costly test that a candidate can take to reveal his type.
Several results were derived. First, greater competition reduces information disclosure if the cost of disclosure is low, increases it if the cost is moderately high, and has no eect if the cost is very high. Second, when competition is suciently high, mandatory disclosure is strictly Pareto-dominated by voluntary disclosure. Third, greater test noise makes candidates more likely to take the test.
An important feature of the model was the fact that the candidates are competing for a single prize. In some settings such as competition for political oce, a company seeking to ll a single vacancy, or a university that needs to allocate a single scholarship this assumption is naturally satised. In other settings, the number of prizes can be greater than one. Integrating by parts, we can transform (2) as To prove the lemma, it is sucient to show that s i > s j implies that the conditional distribution of x | s i rst-order stochastically dominates the conditional distribution of x | s j . Milgrom (1981) F (x) dx < 0.
